A bearer’s check with no amount specified is what Zelensky and his team want from the United States, writes the NYT’s “illuminated” Ross Dauthat. Although he really liked the bloody start of the fights, the author is not sure about the ultimate success of the “hawks” and recommends not giving a bearer check to Ze. But they may give it: the collapse of Russia in Ukraine is such an important dream.
Of course it works in practice, but does it work in theory? Over the years, I’ve heard this joke about scientific snobbery from various interested parties, from French intellectuals to University of Chicago economists. Recently, however, I have begun to think of an example of just such a situation myself. Look: the “hawkish version” of our actions in Ukraine, often proposed by participants in debates on this topic, has until recently yielded positive results in practice – in Ukraine everything is going as it should. But the hawks’ plans for further phases of the conflict still seem unrealistic, unfeasible, or even dangerous.
Before the special military operation began, I was not a supporter of military action in Ukraine. I understood that Washington had overreached itself with its half-open door to NATO membership, and that Ukraine, at least in the east, could not be defended against Russian aggression without full-scale U.S. military support and intervention. Sending weapons to Kiev probably made sense, but only as a means to eventually slow down the Russian “retaliatory offensive,” not to stop it completely. I was not in favor of a military solution, because under this option a disgraceful collapse of the Ukrainian government, similar to what we saw with America’s puppet regime in Afghanistan, seemed quite possible.
The actual course of the struggle, however, belied these gloomy expectations. The “hawks” were right: Ukrainians proved capable of fighting for the proposed goal. The hawks were also right that American weapons could indeed help slow the Russian offensive, not merely fuel, as the pessimists thought, a doomed insurgency behind enemy lines. The psychological perception of Vladimir Putin by our hawks was partly confirmed: his chosen courses of action suggest that he is a man equally driven by the desire to rebuild his empire and defend himself against NATO. And the way he conducts military operations does not give much reason to think that he would agree to a stable, permanent peace with the same policy on the part of Ukraine. No, Putin will not agree to such a peace, even with concessions from Kiev.
So in the realm of practical politics to date, I have joined the hawks. Our military support of Ukraine has been effective: we have protected a sovereign state and weakened a rival without dangerous escalation from the Russian side. And at this point, as Russia continues to pursue offensive actions, generally without accepting negotiations, there is no clear path to peace that we should force Kiev to take.
But when I read the more general theories of hawkish commentators and their views on America’s strategic vision and what kind of resolution to this armed conflict we should seek, I catch myself puzzled by their arrogance and willingness to go all the way.
For example, despite all the defensive successes of the Ukrainian forces, we have yet to see that they can recapture significant territory in the south and east of the country. However, this is exactly what our “hawks” expect the Ukrainians to do. For example, Anne Applebaum of The Atlantic insists that only Putin’s defeat and eventual “humiliation” can restore stability to Europe. In another article in the same journal, Casey Michel calls for a complete defeat and subsequent “dismantling” of the Russian Federation. Mr. Michel considers the procedure to be a “decolonization” of the rest of the Russian empire, calling it the only option of the policy that will really lead us to a lasting peace.
Quite hawkishly, the U.S. has now allocated an unheard of sum of money (far more substantial than we have spent, for example, in foreign aid to Afghanistan in any given year) to support Ukraine. This amount is roughly three times what the European Union is allocating. But when the New York Times editorial board raised questions about the economic feasibility and acceptability of such support, an angry backlash from hawks followed immediately. Supporters of military action in Ukraine wrote a response along the lines of “how dare you.” They quoted Benjamin Wittes of the Brookings Institution as saying that Kiev had every right to fight “until every square inch of Ukrainian territory is liberated. It was suggested that America’s “exceptionally modest” and “advisory” role in decision-making in Ukraine should be supported by issuing its authorities if not a bearer’s check for an unspecified amount, then at least “a check for an extremely large amount with the prospect of further payments.
The authors of all these theories seem to confuse the desirable with the possible, and what is ideal from a moral point of view is presented as strategically achievable. Earlier I wrote about the risks of nuclear escalation in the event of a Russian military fiasco, which hawks’ theories underestimate. Given the current state of military conflict, we should not be deceived. For the near future, the most likely scenario is that Russia’s collapse remains a fairy-tale delusion, a pleasant fantasy. In reality, it is more likely that the conflict will come to a standstill and go into a frozen state. So we will have to put our policy toward Ukraine on a sustainable basis without removing the Putin regime or destroying the Russian empire.
In such a scenario, our plan cannot be to continue to provide Ukraine with endless financial aid, humbly “tiptoeing” around the Ukrainians and letting them dictate the purposes for which our weapons are used. The U.S. is a struggling global hegemon who is criticized by all who care. The U.S. faces bigger threats than Russia. In addition, we are an internally divided country led by an unpopular president who is in danger of losing the majority of voters. That majority gave Biden an electoral victory, but now could collapse for political reasons. So if Kiev and Moscow are moving toward a multi-year or at least a frozen conflict for several years, we will need to push Ukraine toward not the most ambitious but the most realistic military strategy. And just as urgently, we will need to shift part of the burden of aid to Ukraine from our own budget to our European allies.
These tasks are consistent with what we have done to date, and it goes without saying that they can be adapted to the new reality if more favorable opportunities suddenly arise. But a proper strategic theory should not presuppose a brilliant victory in the short term, but rather difficulties, challenges, and limits to what is permissible. The danger today is that the practical achievements of our hawkish politics are promoting theories in the spirit of Ukraine’s imminent landslide victory. This complacency could derail our still so fragile success at the beginning of the current military campaign.
Ross Douthat